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Influence of National Culture on Accounting Conservatism and  
Risk Taking in the Banking Industry 
 
Abstract 
Using an international sample of banks and country-level indices for individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance as proxies for national culture, we study how differences in culture 
across countries affect accounting conservatism and bank risk taking. Consistent with 
expectations, our cross-country analysis indicates that individualism is negatively (positively) 
related to conservatism (risk taking) and uncertainty avoidance is positively (negatively) 
related to conservatism (risk taking).  We also find that cultures that encourage higher risk 
taking experienced more bank failures and bank troubles during the recent financial crisis.   
 
 
JEL classification: G21; G28; G34 
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Influence of National Culture on Accounting Conservatism and  
Risk Taking in the Banking Industry 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bank financial reporting incentives and risk taking are likely to be affected by several 
factors, including differences in ownership structure, bank regulation, bank monitoring, and 
institutional factors such as creditor rights, as well as by national culture. This reasoning is 
supported by the findings of a survey conducted in May 2008 by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit on the factors that created the conditions for the recent banking crisis 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2008) in which 73% of survey participants identified “culture and 
excessive risk taking” as the major cause for the banking crisis. Given the findings of this survey 
and the critical importance of the banking industry to national economies, we conduct a systematic 
study of the influence of national culture on bank financial reporting incentives and risk taking.  
The financial reporting practice we focus on is accounting conservatism, an important and 
widely studied property of a firm’s financial reporting.  In particular, we rely on the principle of 
conservatism that is viewed as requiring higher verification standards for recognizing good news 
than for recognizing bad news (Basu 1997; Watts 2003; Nichols et al. 2009), i.e., asymmetric 
timeliness of recognition of earnings decreases versus earnings increases in accounting income. 
Timely recognition of earnings decreases and delay in recognizing earnings increases will directly 
impact profitability and capital ratios which, in turn, could determine the intensity of monitoring 
by regulators because these measures are used by regulators to identify troubled banks. We predict 
that banks in countries with national cultures that encourage higher risk taking will have less 
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conservative earnings.1 Also of particular interest in this study is whether these differences 
manifest in accounting-based risk measures. This objective is in line with Kaplan’s (2011) call for 
accounting academics to focus on the study of indicators of risk and its drivers.                     
Prior research examines how national culture influences a country’s adoption of 
accounting systems and values (Gray 1988; Salter and Niswander 1995; Radebaugh et al. 2006). 
More recent research studies the relation between national culture and earnings management but 
has generally excluded firms in banking and financial services (e.g., Nabar and Thai 2007; 
Doupnik 2008; Han et al. 2010). An exception is Kanagaretnam et al. (2011), who study the 
relation between cultural factors and bank earnings quality during the pre-financial crisis and crisis 
periods. They find that cultural factors influence income-smoothing and benchmark-beating 
behaviors in the pre-crisis period, and result in large losses and large loan loss provisions in the 
crisis period. Unlike Kanagaretnam et al. (2011), who focus on accounting discretion for earnings 
management, our study’s primary focus is on the links between national culture and accounting 
conservatism and risk taking. 
Another strand of research examines the effects of national culture on accounting 
conservatism. However, most of these studies examine cultural differences between a limited 
number of countries, typically two or three (Sudarwan and Fogarty 1996; Schultz and Lopex 2001; 
Doupnik and Richter 2004; Doupnik and Riccio 2006; Tsakumis 2007).  Additionally most of 
these studies employ surveys or experiments without using the actual reported numbers to measure 
accounting conservatism (Schultz and Lopez 2001; Doupnik and Richter 2004; Doupnik and 
Riccio 2006; Tsakumis 2007). An exception is Salter et al. (2012) who, using reported accounting 
                                                 
1 Our primary objective is to examine the direct effects of national culture on bank accounting conservatism and risk 
taking. The risk taking in banking is most likely related to real actions by managers; however, the ability to take 
higher risk could be constrained by conservative accounting. Thus, the effects of national culture on risk taking could 
be direct and also indirect through conservatism. We explore this possibility later in the study under additional tests.  
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and market data from 22 countries to measure conservatism, find conflicting results. For example, 
they report contradictory results for tests using Basu asymmetric timeliness coefficients and non-
operating accruals to measure conservatism.2 Additionally, their tests employing the Basu measure 
indicate that conservatism is unrelated to individualism and only weakly related to uncertainty 
avoidance. Furthermore, they find that uncertainty avoidance is positively related to non-operating 
accruals, which, contrary to expectations, indicates that firms in high uncertainty avoidance 
countries report less conservatively. Salter et al. (2012) do however report significant results for a 
composite measure of culture that is not commonly used in the literature. 
Our research differs from Salter et al. (2012) and other prior studies in at least three 
important ways. First, we obtain significant, consistent results with a sample comprising a much 
broader set of countries and with a more comprehensive, multiple set of conservatism measures 
used in recent banking research. Second, we examine the effects of culture on risk taking and 
crisis period performance in addition to examining its effects on conservatism. Third, we focus on 
financial firms, which are excluded from prior research, and study measures of conservatism 
specific to the banking sector using proxies directly related to banking-specific accounting 
practices.  
We focus on the banking industry because it offers a unique context for studying the 
effects of national culture on risk-based accounting outcomes. First, banking is an industry where 
risk taking incentives and opportunities are greater relative to other industries. Given the call-
                                                 
2 Many prior studies argue that conservatism measured using a Basu-type regression is noisy (e.g., Dietrich et al. 
2007). Such an approach may be appropriate if stock returns capture true economic income equally well across 
countries over a one-year window and if good and bad economic news is reflected to the same degree in stock returns 
within the one-year window. Salter et al. (2012) recognize this shortcoming and state “Finally, following Givoly and 
Hayn (2000), we measure conditional accounting conservatism as the ratio of non-operating accruals over total 
assets. This measure has the advantage of not relying on stock market price, thus is not influenced by the different 
processes that can contribute to determine stock price in different countries (including 
different levels of market efficiency)”.  
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option nature of bank equity, banks face strong incentives to lend aggressively and take excessive 
risks, often ignoring prudent risk management (Merton 1977). The lower their capital base, the 
less they have to lose and the more they can gain through aggressive lending and other high-risk 
activities. Therefore, the banking industry provides an ideal setting for studying the relations 
between national culture and risk-based accounting outcomes. Second, the banking industry 
facilitates investigation of accounting conservatism as reflected in bank loan loss accounting. 
Given that loan loss accounting has a material effect on bank earnings and balance sheet strength 
and requires a substantial degree of estimation, it is a good setting to observe managers’ 
preferences for conservative accounting (Nichols et al. 2009).  
 We focus on two dimensions of national culture identified by Hofstede (2001), 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance, which we argue are related to bank financial reporting 
conservatism and risk taking.3, 4 High individualism cultures emphasize individual achievements, 
self-orientation and autonomy (Hofstede 2001). Chui et al. (2010) argue that individualism, as 
defined by Hofstede (2001), can be linked to overconfidence, i.e., in high individualism societies 
more decisions are made by the individual and these decisions tend to be driven more by 
overconfidence. Risk taking incentives likely are greater in high individualism societies where 
concern for other stakeholders' welfare is likely to be low. The higher level of overconfidence and 
risk taking in high individualism societies will, in turn, be reflected in less conservative and more 
volatile earnings for firms in such societies.   
                                                 
3 The dimensions of culture developed by Hofstede (1980) have been widely accepted since Hofstede first published 
his results, and have been used by many business researchers. For example, Schultz et al. (1993) and Kachelmeier and 
Shehata (1997) have employed Hofstede’s measures of cultural values in accounting, Gorodnichenko and Roland 
(2011) in economics, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) and Chui et al. (2010) in finance, Nakata and Sivakumar (1996) 
and Aaker and Williams (1998) in marketing, and Franke et al. (1991), Geletkanycz (1997), Tan et al. (1998), Han et 
al. (2010) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) in management. 
4 Han et al. (2010) also study only the individualism and uncertainty avoidance dimensions of national culture. 
Although Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) examine all four commonly used dimensions of national culture, they find 
consistent results only for individualism and uncertainty avoidance. 
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Hofstede (2001, p148) notes that ‘‘uncertainty-avoiding cultures shun ambiguous 
situations. People in such cultures look for structure in their organizations, institutions and 
relationships, which makes events clearly interpretable and predictable.’’ When applied to our 
context, it implies that banks in high uncertainty-avoidance societies are more likely to avoid high 
risk taking. Additionally, if higher uncertainty avoidance leads to a preference for less risk and 
ambiguity, then we are more likely to observe higher accounting conservatism.  
 We use an international bank sample from the BankScope database representing 70 
countries over the period 2000 to 2006 (during the pre-crisis period) to test our main predictions 
on the relation between national culture and bank accounting conservatism and risk taking.5, 6 Our 
results indicate that banks in low individualism and high uncertainty avoidance societies report 
earnings more conservatively than banks in high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance 
societies. Specifically, relative to banks in high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance 
societies, these banks recognize losses in a timelier manner, recognize larger and timelier loan loss 
provisions, recognize proportionately larger loan loss allowances, and recognize larger and 
timelier loan charge-offs.  
 Additionally, we find that the individualism and uncertainty avoidance dimensions of 
national culture are strongly related to two traditional accounting measures of bank risk taking 
(i.e., volatility of earnings and volatility of net interest margin) and to z-score. More specifically, 
individualism is positively and uncertainty avoidance negatively related to these three accounting-
based measures of bank risk. These results hold even after controlling for previously identified 
factors associated with bank risk taking, underscoring the importance of softer dimensions such as 
                                                 
5 The number of countries is smaller than 70 in some analyses that include country-level institutional variables due to 
missing values for these variables. 
6 We focus on the period 2000-2006, because it is generally accepted that the recent global financial crisis started in 
the latter half of 2007 (Ryan 2008; Erkens et al. 2012). 
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national culture that may influence excessive risk taking. Our results are robust to several 
sensitivity tests including exclusion of banks from larger countries (U.S., Germany, Italy, Japan, 
France and Switzerland), restriction of the sample to include only commercial banks, inclusion of 
additional controls for institutional factors, and examination of different sample periods. 
 In supplementary analysis, we examine the effect of national culture on bank failure and 
bank financial trouble during the recent financial/banking crisis spanning the period 2007-2009.7  
We use actual bank failures as well as measures of asset quality, balance sheet strength, and 
profitability to identify whether a bank is in financial trouble during the crisis period. In the U.S., 
bank examiners use the CAMELS rating system which relies on several financial ratios and 
management characteristics to assess bank performance and identify banks that are in trouble. 
Because the CAMELS rating or other similar indicators of troubled banks are not publicly 
available for banks around the world, we classify banks as troubled using publicly available data 
that reflect asset quality, capital adequacy and profitability. We use the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to total loans to measure asset quality, the ratio of total equity capital to total assets to 
measure capital adequacy, and the ratio of net income to total assets to measure profitability. Our 
evidence shows that bank failure and bank financial trouble are higher in societies where 
individualism is higher and uncertainty avoidance is lower.  
We conduct several additional analyses. First, we find that in the pre-crisis period, banks in 
low individualism and high uncertainty avoidance cultures report lower accounting performance, 
fewer risky mortgage loans, higher asset quality, and higher capital ratios (balance sheet strength) 
compared to banks in high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance societies. Second, we 
                                                 
7 It is generally accepted that the recent financial crisis in the US and UK started in 2007 (Ryan 2008). However, the 
financial crisis spread to other countries in 2008 (Laeven and Valencia 2010).  
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examine the direct and indirect effects through accounting conservatism of national culture on 
bank risk taking. We first develop a measure of relative accounting conservatism which is proxied 
by mean abnormal loan loss allowance. Using path analysis, we find that the direct effect of 
culture  on bank risk taking is considerably larger its the indirect effect through accounting 
conservatism. Third, we examine whether two other commonly discussed dimensions of culture 
identified by Hofstede, namely masculinity and power distance, are associated with bank 
conservatism and risk taking. Although masculinity and power distance are related to accounting 
conservatism, risk taking and financial distress in some tests, we do not observe a consistent, 
systematic relation as we do with the individualism and uncertainty avoidance dimensions of 
culture. 
  Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it contributes to prior research 
on factors affecting bank reporting conservatism. Nichols et al. (2009) document that bank 
ownership structure is an important determinant of reporting conservatism. We provide evidence 
that another important determinant of bank reporting conservatism is culture. This finding is 
especially important for studies that examine cross-country differences in financial reporting. Our 
study differs from Kanagaretnam et al. (2011) in that we focus on the link between national 
culture and accounting conservatism and risk taking. We do not expect conservatism and earnings 
management to be mechanically associated. For example, Jackson and Liu (2010) document that 
firms may use conservative accounting to facilitate earnings management.8 Their results are 
consistent with the findings of Givoly et al. (2010) that conservatism is not associated with 
earnings management as measured by discretionary accruals. Earnings management can exist in 
                                                 
8 Jackson and Liu (2010) study the interrelationship between conservatism and earnings management by examining 
the allowance for uncollectible accounts and its income statement counterpart, bad debt expense. They find that firms 
manage bad debt expense downward to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts and that conservatism accentuates the 
extent to which firms manage bad debt expense.  
 8 
 
the presence of conservatism because it tends to be episodic and small in magnitude, and thus 
unlikely to obscure the more prevalent phenomenon of accounting conservatism. Additionally, in 
the banking context, Bushman and Williams (2012) document that while accounting discretion 
degrades transparency, there is no direct effect on risk taking.  We also examine how national 
culture affects bank risk taking, which has not been studied by Kanagaretnam et al. (2011). 
Second, our study shows that differences in bank risk taking influenced by differences in 
national culture manifest in accounting-based risk measures. Our results demonstrate that even in 
an opaque industry such as banking, accounting-based risk measures capture the predicted 
relations between national culture and risk taking. Third, our study extends prior research that 
examines bank risk taking behavior. Whereas prior studies focus on the implications of 
institutions, regulation, and governance for risk taking by banks (e.g., Laeven and Levine 2009; 
Houston et al. 2010), we show that, in addition to these institutional and regulatory characteristics, 
national culture also affects bank risk taking. Fourth, our study contributes to research 
investigating the relation between culture and corporate and individual decision making (e.g., 
Hilary and Hui 2009; Chui et al. 2010). We show that cultural differences between societies have a 
profound influence on the level of risk taking by banks. Our findings support the growing 
awareness among researchers studying international financial markets that informal institutions 
such as culture matter in financial decisions, even when those decisions are made by sophisticated 
professional managers. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss related research on cultural 
dimensions and develop our predictions on the effects of cultural dimensions on accounting 
conservatism and bank risk taking in the next section. We present the research design and describe 
the data in section three. We discuss the results in section four, and provide our conclusions in the 
final section. 
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II. INDIVIDUALISM, UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE, ACCOUNTING 
CONSERVATISM, AND RISK TAKING 
We hypothesize that cultural factors influence the level of accounting conservatism and 
risk taking in banks. In particular, we predict that banks in high individualism societies take more 
risk and report less conservative earnings, whereas banks in high uncertainty avoidance societies 
take less risk and report more conservative earnings.  
Prior research argues that a society’s culture affects its behavior and values. Hofstede and 
Bond (1988, p 6) define culture as ‘‘the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one category of people from those of another. Culture is composed of certain values, 
which shape behavior as well as one’s perception of the world.” More recently, Licht et al. (2005, 
p 234) state that a “common postulate in cross-cultural psychology is that all societies confront 
similar basic issues or problems when they come to regulate human activity. The key dimensions 
of culture are derived from these issues, because the preferred ways of dealing with them are 
expressed in different societal value emphases. It is thus possible to characterize the culture of 
different societies by measuring prevailing value emphases on these key dimensions. This yields 
unique cultural profiles.” Given these observations, we utilize the cultural dimensions pioneered 
by Hofstede (1980, 2001) for characterizing national culture.  
The first cultural dimension we examine is individualism. According to Franke et al. 
(1991, p166), “Individualism is the tendency of individuals primarily to look after themselves and 
their immediate families, and its inverse is the integration of people into cohesive groups.” A long-
standing literature in economics and social psychology focuses on the distinction between 
collective (group-based) decision making and individual-based decision making, and its effect on 
risk behavior (Kerr et al. 1996). Shupp and Williams (2008) find that groups are more risk averse 
than individuals in high-risk situations, and that group decisions exhibit smaller variance than 
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individual decisions. Chui et al. (2010) argue that individualism, as defined by Hofstede (2001), 
can be linked to overconfidence, i.e., in high individualism societies, more decisions are made by 
the individual and these decisions tend to be driven more by overconfidence. Han et al. (2010) 
posit that where individualism is the dominant culture, managers will have more latitude in terms 
of self-governance (professionalism) and flexibility of measurement. High individualism cultures 
also emphasize individual achievements, self-orientation and autonomy (Hofstede 2001). Risk 
taking incentives may also be greater in high individualism societies where concern for other 
stakeholders' welfare (an indicator of collectivism) is likely to be low. Collectively, the above 
arguments suggest that the level of overconfidence and risk taking will be higher in high 
individualism societies. This, in turn, should manifest in less conservative and more volatile 
earnings. 
 The second cultural dimension we examine relates to uncertainty avoidance. Uncertainty is 
one of the key determinants of market transactions, and plays a critical role in business (Hofstede 
1980, 2001). Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance index assesses the extent to which people feel 
threatened by uncertainty and ambiguity, and try to avoid these situations. Low uncertainty 
avoidance societies socialize their people into accepting or tolerating uncertainty. Accordingly, 
individuals in such societies are less averse to taking risks. By contrast, people living in high 
uncertainty avoidance societies tend to have a higher level of anxiety, which may manifest in 
greater nervousness, emotionality, and aggressiveness. As a coping mechanism against 
uncertainty, people in high uncertainty avoidance societies prefer a more predictable environment. 
Hofstede (2001, p148) states that uncertainty avoidance does not equal risk avoidance, where he 
goes on to explain “[U]ncertainty is to risk as anxiety is to fear. Fear and risk are both focused on 
something specific: an object in the case of fear, an event in the case of risk. Risk is often 
expressed in a percentage of probability that an event may happen. Anxiety and uncertainty are 
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both diffuse feeling. Anxiety has no object, and uncertainty has no probability attached to it.” 
Although uncertainty avoidance is conceptually different from risk avoidance, Kwok and Tadesse 
(2006) develop and test arguments about how uncertainty avoidance affects the investment 
preference of individuals. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) show that countries scoring high on 
uncertainty avoidance are also characterized by a (relatively) more risk averse bank-based 
financial system, whereas countries scoring low on uncertainty avoidance are characterized by a 
(relatively) less risk averse market-based financial system. Collectively, the above arguments 
suggest that the propensity for risk taking will be lower in high uncertainty avoidance societies 
than in low uncertainty avoidance societies. This in turn should manifest in less volatile earnings 
for high uncertainty avoidance societies. Additionally, if higher uncertainty avoidance leads to a 
preference for less risk and ambiguity, then we are more likely to observe higher accounting 
conservatism in these societies.9 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
Measures and Models for Accounting Conservatism 
We employ both aggregate earnings and several disaggregated accounting measures from 
bank loan loss accounting to examine accounting conservatism. Overall, we rely on the principle 
of conservatism that is viewed as requiring higher verification standards for recognizing good 
news than for recognizing bad news (Basu 1997; Watts 2003; Nichols et al. 2009), i.e., 
asymmetric timeliness of recognition of earnings declines versus gains in accounting income. 
Additionally, in the banking industry, the timely recognition of losses is critical because of the 
importance of exposure to losses from various types of risk as well as capital adequacy 
                                                 
9 However, because banks operate in a highly regulated environment in that they are monitored by Central Banks and 
other regulatory agencies (such as deposit insurance corporations), the overall level of risk taking likely is conditional 
on the level of regulation and bank monitoring. Consequently, the uncertainty avoidance dimension of culture may 
not be as important in influencing risk taking in banks relative to industrial firms. 
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regulations, which relate to the ability of a bank to absorb losses and remain solvent for 
depositors. We extend this line of inquiry by examining the impact of national culture on bank 
accounting conservatism. 
Our model for testing accounting conservatism using aggregate earnings follows from Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005) and Nichols et al. (2009): 
ΔNIt = α0 + α1DΔNIt-1 + α2ΔNIt-1 + α 3ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 + α4CULTURE+ α5CULTURE*DΔNIt-1  
+ α6CULTURE*ΔNIt-1 + α7CULTURE*ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 + α8SIZE + α9SIZE*DΔNIt-1  
+ α10SIZE*ΔNIt-1 + α11SIZE*ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 + γWk + YEAR + εi,k                             (1)   
where ΔNIt denotes the change in net income from year t - 1 to t, scaled by total assets at the end 
of t - 1, and DΔNIt-1 denotes an indicator variable that equals 1 if ΔNIt-1 is negative and 0 
otherwise. In essence, model (1) is an auto-regression of earnings changes (i.e., a regression of 
current period change in earnings (ΔNIt) on prior period change in earnings (ΔNIt-1)), that is 
augmented by permitting the auto-regressive relation to differ for positive and negative values of 
ΔNIt-1 and for differing values of culture (CULTURE). The model also controls for the effects of 
differences in size on the estimated auto-regressive relations. Additionally, equation (1) includes 
several country-level variables (Wk) to isolate the effect of national culture from the effects of 
other country characteristics, and year indicators (YEAR) to control for year fixed effects. We 
estimate the model with robust standard errors clustered by country and bank to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and serial dependence (Petersen 2009). 
As discussed in Nichols et al. (2009), under conditional conservatism, we expect 
asymmetry in the timeliness of recognition of earnings decreases versus increases in accounting 
income. Economic gains must meet a higher verification threshold to be recognized in accounting 
income, so earnings increases are likely to be less timely and more persistent, implying α2 should 
be positive. We expect a lower verification threshold and therefore more timely recognition of 
 13 
 
earnings declines than gains. Consequently, we predict a negative value for α3. Our main 
predictions are that banks in high individualism societies will have less conservative accounting 
whereas banks in high uncertainty avoidance societies will have more conservative accounting. 
Specifically, we predict that the coefficient α7 on CULTURE*ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 will be positive 
(negative) in high individualism (high uncertainty avoidance) societies. 
In separate regressions, we also include several country-level variables to isolate the effect 
of national culture from the effects of other country characteristics that may influence bank 
financial reporting and risk taking. We present the details of these country-level controls in Table 
1. The first set of controls relates specifically to the banking industry. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002) show that systemic banking crises are more likely in countries with higher 
deposit insurance coverage limits. We therefore include a control for deposit insurance (DI) in the 
model.10 We also control for bank competition (COMP) which may affect the stability of the 
banking sector (Allen and Gale 2000; Boyd and De Nicolo 2005).  
 The second set of controls relates to the institutional environment in a country. We control 
for creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (IS) because Houston et al. (2010) show that 
stronger creditor rights promote greater bank risk taking, and greater information sharing among 
creditors leads to lower bank risk. As in Laeven and Levine (2009), we control for the degree to 
which the law is fairly and effectively enforced in a country (ENFORCE). We also control for the 
legal origin (COMMON) as Cole and Turk-Ariss (2010) show that banks in common law countries 
allocate a significantly larger portion of their assets to risky loans than banks in code law 
countries. Lastly, we control for economic well-being of the country, measured as the natural log 
                                                 
10 Following Laeven and Levine (2009), DI is an indicator variable that equals one if the country has explicit deposit 
insurance, and zero otherwise. We also use an alternative measure, log of one plus the ratio of deposit insurance 
coverage to deposits per capita, as in Houston et al. (2010), to capture deposit insurance. The results are similar across 
the two measures. 
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of Gross Domestic Product per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (denoted as LGDP), because 
countries with different income levels are subject to different economic shocks and sources of 
volatility, which likely affect bank risk taking.  
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
We also employ several disaggregated measures from bank loan loss accounting to 
examine bank accounting conservatism. These models are discussed in detail when we present the 
results in section 4.  
Measures and Models for Bank Risk Taking 
We measure bank risk taking using two traditional accounting-based measures of bank risk 
as well as z-score. The first two measures, σ(ROA) and σ(NIM), measure the volatility of return on 
assets (ROA) and net interest margin (NIM) respectively, and are computed as the standard 
deviation of ROA and NIM over the period 2000-2006. They reflect the degree of risk taking in a 
bank’s operations (Laeven and Levine 2009; Houston et al. 2010). The third measure is z-score, a 
measure of bank stability that indicates the distance from insolvency (Laeven and Levin 2009; 
Houston et al. 2010). Specifically, z = (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is earnings before taxes 
and loan loss provisions divided by assets, CAR is capital-asset ratio, and σ(ROA) is standard 
deviation of ROA. ROA and CAR are mean values estimated over 2000-2006, and σ(ROA) is the 
standard deviation of ROA estimated over the same period.11 Z-score indicates the number of 
standard deviations a bank’s return on assets has to drop below its expected value before equity is 
depleted and the bank is insolvent. Thus, a higher z-score indicates that the bank is more stable 
and less risky. Because z-score is highly skewed, we use its natural logarithm and use the negative 
                                                 
11 We require at least three years of data for each bank to calculate the standard deviation of return on assets over 
time. Our inferences remain unchanged when we restrict the sample to banks that have all seven years of data 
available. 
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value so that a higher value indicates higher risk. For brevity, we refer to the negative of the 
natural logarithm of z-score as “z-score” in the remainder of the paper.  
In order to assess the effect of national culture on bank risk taking, we regress our three 
risk measures on the two dimensions of national culture, and bank- and country-level control 
variables. Our main regression specification is as follows: 
R = γ0 + γ1 CULTURE + γ2 SIZE1 + γ3 REVG + γ4 LLP1 + γ5 EQTY + γ6 TOOBIG  
          + γ7 W + ε                              (2) 
where R is one of the three risk measures (volatility of return on assets (σ(ROA)), volatility of net 
interest margin (σ(NIM)), and z-score), CULTURE represents the two dimensions of national 
culture (i.e., individualism (IND) and uncertainty avoidance (UA)), and W is a vector of country 
characteristics. As before, we estimate the regression clustered by country with robust standard 
errors. In discussing the results, we focus on the signs and significance of the coefficients on 
CULTURE. We expect bank risk to increase with individualism and decrease with uncertainty 
avoidance. Accordingly, we expect a positive coefficient on IND and a negative coefficient on 
UA.12  
We include several bank-level variables to control for cross-sectional differences in bank 
characteristics that may influence the relationship between national culture and accounting-based 
bank risk measures. Consistent with Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al. (2010), we 
control for bank size (SIZE1) measured as the logarithm of mean total assets in U.S. dollars over 
2000-2006. We control for bank revenue growth (REVG), which is the average growth rate of 
bank revenue over the period 2000–2006. We also control for average loan loss provision over the 
                                                 
12 Potential reverse causality may cause endogeneity problems. In our study, the potential for reverse causality is less 
of a concern than in a pure cross-country analysis because it is unlikely that risk taking by banks will affect national 
culture. Additionally, the indices for cultural values were developed prior to the sample period covered in this study. 
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period 2000–2006 (LLP1), for whether the bank accounts for more than 10% of its country’s 
deposits (TOOBIG), and for equity-to-asset ratio (EQTY). As in equation (1), in separate 
regressions, we also include several country-level variables (W). We control for creditor rights 
(CR), information sharing (IS), the degree to which the law is fairly and effectively enforced in a 
country (ENFORCE), legal origin (COMMON) and economic well-being (LGDP). We provide the 
details of these bank-level and country-level control variables in Table 1. 
Data 
 
We obtain financial data for the international banks for the 2000-2006 (pre-crisis) period 
from the BankScope database.13 Recent surveys and replication studies have expanded Hofstede’s 
cultural database from the initial 50 countries to 70 countries, with data available for both 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance.14 We thus have a maximum of 70 countries available for 
the analysis that controls for bank characteristics. Some bank-level variables (such as non-
performing loans and net loan charge-offs) are not available for certain countries. Our sample for 
the analysis that includes country-level institutional variables comprises 65 countries because of 
missing institutional data (such as creditor rights, law enforcement index) for five countries.15 The 
values of the institutional variables at the country level are reported in Table 2, which also 
provides the number of banks and bank-year observations by country. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
                                                 
13 As indicated in Laeven and Valencia (2010), the recent financial crisis began in 2007 for the UK and US and 
spread to other countries in 2008. In sensitivity tests, we discuss the robustness of our results to different definitions 
of pre-crisis period (i.e., 2000 -2005 and 2000-2007). 
14 The most current version of the data is available at http://www.geert-hofstede.com/. 
15 The five countries with missing institutional data are Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Suriname, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 3, we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in the accounting 
conservatism and risk taking tests in Panels A and B respectively. For each variable, we report the 
distribution of the variable, number of countries with available data, and number of bank-year 
observations. The number of bank-level observations also varies because of data availability. In 
Panel A, the mean change in income is 0.2% of total assets and, on average, 33% of the sample 
banks report a decline in earnings. The means of loan loss provisions (LLPt), net loan charge-offs 
(NCOt), and loan loss allowance (LLAt) are 1%, 1% and 4% of total loans, respectively. The 
distributions of the other variables used in the accounting conservatism test are also reported in 
Panel A.  In Panel B, the variables used in the risk taking test are computed for each bank over the 
sample period 2000-2006. The mean values of the risk variables, σ(ROA), σ(NIM) and z-score, are 
0.006, 0.008 and -3.486, respectively. These values are similar to the statistics reported in prior 
studies and exhibit considerable variation across countries.16 Panel C of Table 3 reports descriptive 
statistics for the country-level variables. Our two variables of interest, individualism (IND) and 
uncertainty avoidance (UA), have means (standard deviations) of 44.03 (23.97) and 67.51 (23.64), 
respectively.17 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We present Pearson correlations between the variables used in the accounting conservatism 
and risk taking regressions in Panel A and Panel B, respectively, of Table 4. While the three 
proxies for bank risk taking are highly correlated as expected, the correlations between σ(ROA), 
                                                 
16 Note that we multiply our z-score measure by -1 so that higher values indicate greater risk taking. In comparison, 
the mean values reported in Houston et al. (2011) for these three variables are 0.012, 0.015 and 3.240, respectively, 
and the mean values for σ(ROA) and z-score in Laeven and Levine (2009) are 0.01 and 2.88, respectively. 
17 Note that the number of observations for some institutional variables is less than 70 due to missing data. 
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σ(NIM), and z-score are less than one, indicating that each measure likely reflects different 
dimensions of bank risk taking behavior. Panel C of Table 4, which reports correlations among the 
country-level institutional variables, indicates that some of the correlations are high. To address 
concern with this high level of multicollinearity, we perform all our tests without and with the 
inclusion of country-level institutional controls.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Culture and Accounting Conservatism 
 We estimate the effects of culture on accounting conservatism using equation (1) and 
report the results in Panel A of Table 5. The first two models examine the effects of individualism 
(IND) and the last two models examine the effects of uncertainty avoidance (UA). As expected, 
the coefficient on ΔNIt-1* DΔNIt-1 (α3) is negative and significant, indicating that banks are timelier 
in reporting earnings declines compared with reporting earnings increases. Our main predictions 
are that banks in high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance societies will report earnings 
less conservatively. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficients on IND*ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 (α7) in 
Models 1 and 2 are positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating lower differential timeliness 
of recognizing earnings declines versus gains in high individualism societies. Also consistent with 
our prediction, the coefficients on UA*ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 (α7) in Models 3 and 4 are negative and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that recognition of earnings declines is more timely than 
recognition of earnings increases when uncertainty avoidance is higher. These results provide 
support for our prediction that conditional accounting conservatism is higher in societies where 
individualism is lower and where uncertainty avoidance is higher.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We next refine the analysis by examining the relation between loan loss provisions and 
changes in nonperforming loans. Changes in nonperforming loans represent exogenous and 
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relatively nondiscretionary indicators of possible future credit losses. We assess how national 
culture affects the timeliness of accounting recognition of economic losses by examining the 
associations between loan loss provisions and lagged, contemporaneous, and future changes in 
nonperforming loans.  
Following Nichols et al. (2009), we estimate the following model of loan loss provisions, 
after controlling for potentially confounding differences in bank size, type of loans outstanding, 
lagged loan loss allowance, and net loan charge-offs: 
LLPt  = β0 + β1 ΔNPLt-1 + β2 ΔNPLt + β3 ΔNPLt+1 + β4 NCOt + β5 NCOt+1 + β6 CULTURE  
+ β7 CULTURE*ΔNPLt-1 + β8 CULTURE*ΔNPLt+ β9 CULTURE*ΔNPLt+1  
+ β10 CULTURE*NCOt+ β11 CULTURE*NCOt+1+ β12 LLAt-1 + β13 HOMPt-1  
+ β14 CAPt + β15 LNGROt + β16 SIZEt + β17 SIZEt*ΔNPLt-1 + β18 SIZEt*ΔNPLt  
+ β19 SIZEt*ΔNPLt+1+ β20 SIZEt*NCOt + β21 SIZEt* NCOt+1 + γ Wk + YEAR + εi,k    (3a) 
The model is estimated with robust standard errors clustered by country and bank. Details 
of the variable definitions are shown in Table 1. Loan loss provisions in year t reflect expectations 
of loan losses based on information about loans that became delinquent during the previous year 
(ΔNPLt-1) or the current year (ΔNPLt), or that are expected to become delinquent in the future 
(ΔNPLt+1). Loan loss provisions also relate to loan charge-offs (that is, loss realizations) during the 
current year (NCOt) and future years (NCOt+1).18 We therefore expect positive coefficients on 
these five variables. However, since managers also have discretion in the timing of loan charge-
offs, the relationship between culture, LLP and NCO may not be as strong as the relationship 
between culture, LLP and ΔNPL.    
                                                 
18 The results reported in Table 4 show that although most of the correlations are low, some correlations are high. For 
example, the correlation between current loan charge-offs and future loan charge-offs, which are both included in 
equation (3a), is 0.74. Hence, to ensure that multicollinearity is not driving our results, we check for the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) in this and all other empirical tests. The VIFs are all less than 10, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not a serious concern (Kennedy 2008; Neter 1996). 
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To assess the effect of national culture on loan loss recognition, we interact these five 
variables with our two proxies for culture, IND and UA.  We predict that banks in low (high) 
individualism (uncertainty avoidance) societies recognize larger or more timely loan loss 
provisions relative to changes in nonperforming loans than banks in high (low) individualism 
(uncertainty avoidance) societies. Hence, we expect the coefficients β7, β8, and β9 to be negative 
(positive).19 We include HOMP, CAP, and LNGRO to control for the effects of differences in type 
of loans, regulatory capital, and loan growth on loan loss provisions. We report the results of this 
test in Panel B of Table 5.  
The positive and significant coefficients on ΔNPLt-1 (β1) and ΔNPLt (β2) imply that, in 
general, banks recognize loan loss provisions in a timelier manner relative to changes in 
nonperforming loans, indicating some degree of accounting conservatism. Consistent with our 
predictions, the coefficients on IND*ΔNPLt -1 (β7) and IND*ΔNPLt (β8) are both negative and 
significant while the coefficients on UA*ΔNPLt-1 (β7) and UA*ΔNPLt (β8) are both positive and 
significant, indicating that banks in low individualism and high uncertainty avoidance societies 
recognize larger and timelier loan loss provisions than banks in high individualism and low 
uncertainty avoidance societies. However, the coefficients on IND*ΔNPLt+1 (UA*ΔNPLt+1) are not 
significantly negative (positive).20 Although not as strong as the results in Panel A for earnings 
changes, these results generally indicate that banks in low individualism and high uncertainty 
avoidance societies exhibit more conservative loan loss accounting than banks in high 
individualism and low uncertainty avoidance societies.  
                                                 
19 Similar to Nichols et al. (2009), we make no prediction about the signs of the coefficients on β10 and β11 since the 
associations between culture and net charge-offs are ambiguous. 
20 These results are consistent with Nichols et al. (2009), who also report significant results only for past and current 
changes in NPL.  
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In the previous analyses, we examine how national culture affects accounting conservatism 
in recognizing loan loss provisions. We now turn to the balance sheet and predict that banks in 
low individualism and high uncertainty avoidance societies recognize more conservative (larger) 
loan loss allowances than banks in high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance societies. 
We test this prediction by estimating the following loan loss allowance model: 
LLAt  = β0 + β1 CULTURE + β2 SIZEt + β3 HOMPt+ β4 CAPt + β5 LNGROt + β6 NPLt  
 + γ Wk + YEAR + εi,k                      (3b) 
where LLAt  denotes loan loss allowance for year t divided by loans for year t, and other variables 
are as defined in Table 1. As before, the model is estimated with both country and bank clustering. 
We predict that banks in high individualism (uncertainty avoidance) societies will 
recognize relatively smaller (larger) loan loss allowance than banks in low individualism 
(uncertainty avoidance) societies; we therefore expect a negative (positive) coefficient on IND 
(UA). As in equation (3a), we include HOMPt, CAPt, LNGROt and NPLt to control for the effects 
of differences in type of loans, regulatory capital, loan growth, and nonperforming loans on 
expected loan loss allowance across banks. 
We report the results in Panel C of Table 5.  As predicted, the coefficient on IND is 
significantly negative and the coefficient on UA is significantly positive, indicating that banks in 
low individualism and high uncertainty avoidance societies recognize proportionately larger loan 
loss allowance than banks in high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance societies. As for 
economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in IND (UA) is associated with a 
decrease (an increase) in loan loss allowance of 1.0 - 1.4% (0.7- 0.9%) of total loans. When 
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compared to our sample mean LLA of about 4% of total loans, the economic impact of each of the 
culture variables on LLA is clearly nontrivial.21 
In the final test for accounting conservatism, we examine the relation between national 
culture and loan charge-offs. We predict that banks in more conservative cultures will exhibit 
more conditional conservatism in writing off bad loans than banks in less conservative cultures. 
We test this prediction by estimating the following model of loan charge-offs with both country 
and bank clustering: 
LCOt  = β0 + β1 CULTURE + β2 SIZEt + β3 HOMPt+ β4 CAPt + β5 LNGROt + β6 ΔNPLt-1  
 + β7 CULTURE*ΔNPLt-1 + β8 ΔNPLt + β8 CULTURE*ΔNPLt + γ Wk + YEAR + εi,k   (3c) 
where LCOt denotes loan charge-offs for year t divided by total loans at the end of year t - 1, and 
other variables are as defined in Table 1. Loan charge-offs in year t likely reflect realizations of 
managers’ expectations of loan losses that became delinquent during the previous year (ΔNPLt-1); 
hence we expect a positive coefficient on ΔNPLt-1.22  
To assess the effect of national culture on LCO timeliness, we interact ΔNPLt-1 and ΔNPLt 
with the two proxies for culture. Our primary prediction is that banks in conservative cultures (low 
individualism and high uncertainty avoidance) recognize larger and timelier loan charge-offs 
relative to changes in nonperforming loans than banks in less conservative cultures (high 
individualism and low uncertainty avoidance). Hence, we predict that the coefficient, β7, on 
IND*ΔNPLt-1 (UA* ΔNPLt-1) will be negative (positive). 
                                                 
21 We do not assess the economic significance of the interaction terms involving culture in equations (1), (3a), and 
other equations because it is difficult to clearly interpret their economic significance.  
22 As in Nichols et al. (2009), we do not have a directional prediction for the relation between LCOt and ΔNPLt. This 
relation is ambiguous because, even though ΔNPLt serves as a leading indicator that should be positively related to 
future LCOs, the contemporaneous association between ΔNPLt and LCOt should be negative (when a bank charges off 
an uncollectible loan it also removes it from nonperforming status, so current period LCOs trigger negative ΔNPLs). 
We also do not make a directional prediction for the coefficient on CULTURE*ΔNPLt because of the potential 
ambiguity in this relation as described above. 
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We report the results in Panel D of Table 5. As predicted, we find a positive coefficient on 
ΔNPLt-1, indicating that banks generally recognize loan charge-offs in a timely manner relative to 
changes in prior period nonperforming loans. This result indicates that banks exhibit some degree 
of accounting conservatism. Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on IND*ΔNPLt-1 
(UA*ΔNPLt-1) is significantly negative (positive) at the 1% level, indicating that banks in more 
conservative cultures recognize larger and timelier loan charge-offs than banks in less 
conservative cultures.  
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 5 indicates that banks in low individualism and 
high uncertainty avoidance societies are more conservative in financial reporting than banks in 
high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance societies.  
Culture and Risk Taking 
We regress each of the three risk measures for individual banks on national culture, bank-
level control variables and country-level control variables, and report the results in Table 6. The 
first four models present results using σ(ROA) as the risk measure. We expect banks to take more 
risk when individualism is high and less risk when uncertainty avoidance is high. Consistent with 
our predictions, the coefficient on IND is positive and significant at the 1% level, while the 
coefficient on UA is negative and significant at the 1% level in all four models. As for the 
economic significance of the coefficients on IND and UA, a one standard deviation change in IND 
is associated with a change in σ(ROA) of 0.002, while a one standard deviation change in UA is 
associated with a change in σ(ROA) of between 0.001 and 0.002. Given that the mean σ(ROA) for 
our sample is 0.006, the economic significance of each of these two dimensions of culture is 
nontrivial.23 These results indicate that banks take more risk in societies where individualism is 
                                                 
23 The economic size of the coefficients on IND and UA are comparable in models (5) to (12) of Table 6. 
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high or uncertainty avoidance is low. Overall, the evidence exhibits that national culture plays an 
important role in influencing risk taking by banks and this influence is reflected in accounting 
outcomes. 
With regard to bank-level controls, we find that larger banks, higher-growth banks, and 
banks with higher equity-to-assets ratio take more risk. These results are largely consistent with 
the evidence reported in earlier studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine 2009; Houston et al. 2010). For 
the country-level controls, the coefficient estimate for DI is positive and significant, consistent 
with the argument that DI increases the moral hazard problem (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
2002). Banks are less risky in countries with higher economic well-being (LGDP).  
 Models (5) to (8) of Table 6 report results using σ(NIM) as the risk measure, while models 
(9) to (12) of Table 6 report results using z-score as the risk measure. Consistent with our 
prediction, the coefficients on IND are positive and the coefficients on UA are negative, and all are 
significant at the 1% level. Both the bank-level and country-level variables exhibit qualitatively 
similar results to those reported in models (1) to (4) of Table 6.    
Collectively, the results reported in Table 6 provide robust support for our prediction that 
national culture has an important impact on bank risk taking and is reflected in accounting-based 
risk measures. Specifically, bank risk taking is higher in societies with higher individualism and 
lower uncertainty avoidance.24 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
                                                 
24 Since Tosi and Greckhamer (2004) find that national culture affects CEO compensation, as a sensitivity check, we 
include an additional country-level control, PCTEQ, defined as the sum of the value of option compensation and 
restricted stock compensation divided by total compensation, in the model. We use the CEO compensation data for 40 
countries provided by Bryan et al. (2010) at the country level as an alternate proxy for CEO incentives. Our main 
inferences are not affected by the inclusion of this additional variable. 
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National Culture and Accounting Performance  
We explore how higher risk taking manifests in various aspects of accounting 
performance. In particular, we expect that banks in countries with cultures that encourage higher 
risk taking will have higher accounting performance (at least in the short run during growth 
periods) as well as higher levels of risky loans, such as mortgage loans. However, banks in 
countries with cultures that encourage higher risk taking are more likely to have lower asset 
quality and capital strength. Consistent with our expectations, in untabulated results, we find that 
banks in high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance societies report higher accounting 
performance and have more risky mortgage loans, but have lower asset quality and capital ratios 
(balance sheet strength) compared to banks in low individualism and high uncertainty avoidance 
societies. 
Exclusion of Banks from the U.S. and Other Large Countries 
Although our results are robust to several alternative measures of accounting conservatism 
and bank risk, one major concern is that the results may be unduly influenced by a subset of large 
banks in a few key countries. Because banks from the U.S., Germany, Italy, Japan, France, and 
Switzerland constitute about 60% of the sample, we re-estimate the regressions after dropping 
banks from these countries in the analysis. The results are robust to the exclusion of banks from 
these countries. Specifically, we find that banks in more conservative cultures (low individualism 
and high uncertainty avoidance) take lower risk and report more conservative earnings than banks 
in less conservative cultures (high individualism and low uncertainty avoidance). 
Additional Controls for Institutional Factors 
Following Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al. (2010), we control for activity 
restrictions by including RESTRICT, an indicator of the degree to which banks face regulatory 
restrictions on their activities in securities markets, insurance, real-estate, and owning shares in 
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non-financial firms (Barth et al. 2006). Barth et al. (2006) show that the banking system is more 
fragile in countries where banking activities are more restricted. We also control for capital 
stringency (CAPST) in banks using the approach in Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al. 
(2010). CAPST is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital from Barth et al. (2006). In 
addition, we control for investor protection rights (RIGHTS) because shareholder protection laws 
in each country may affect bank risk taking (Laeven and Levine 2009). These variables are not 
used in our main analysis because of missing information which reduces the number of countries 
included in the sample to 49. We re-estimate all our regressions with the addition of these three 
institutional controls and find that all our main results continue to hold. There is no evidence to 
suggest that our results are driven by these omitted institutional characteristics. 
Other Robustness Tests 
 
We conduct several additional robustness tests. First, we examine whether our main results 
hold for large banks. Large banks may be better able to diversify risk and have more stable 
earnings and reduced risk of insolvency. On the other hand, large banks may take greater risks, 
especially if they consider themselves too-big-to-fail. We define a bank as large if it is in the top 
quartile in terms of the assets in the pooled bank sample, and all other banks as small. The 
untabulated results indicate that the association between national culture, accounting conservatism 
and bank risk taking is stronger for the large banks, and weaker or not significant for the smaller 
banks. About 40% of our bank sample consists of commercial banks, with the remaining 
comprised of bank holding companies, finance companies, savings banks, and other types of 
banks. In our second robustness test, we analyze the subsample that includes only the commercial 
banks. Our untabulated results indicate that the main inferences are robust. 
We compute all the risk measures (σ(ROA), σ(NIM), and z-score) in our main tests over  
the period 2000-2006. As another robustness check, we re-compute these measures over two 
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alternate time periods (i.e., 2000–2005 and 2000–2007). Our results are robust to these alternative 
measurement period specifications.  
Lastly, we conduct our main analysis at the country-year level. We compute the means of 
the variables used in the accounting conservatism and risk taking measures for each country-year, 
and regress them on the two culture variables and bank-level, institutional  controls.  Again, our 
results are similar to those reported in the main tables, with all the test variables significant in the 
predicted direction at 10% or lower.  
Crisis Period Analysis 
 In this section, we provide preliminary evidence on whether cultural factors help explain 
bank failure and financial difficulties experienced by banks during the recent financial crisis 
spanning the period 2007-2009. Most previous studies of bank failure rely on bank-level 
accounting data to predict bank failure (e.g., Meyer and Pifer 1970; Arena 2008; Jin et al. 2011). 
For example, Arena (2008) studies the relationship of bank failure and bank fundamentals during 
the 1990s Latin America and East Asia banking crises, and finds that individual bank conditions 
explain bank failure, while macroeconomic shocks that triggered the crises primarily destabilized 
the weak banks ex ante.  
 We hand-collect data on the failed banks from primarily government and central bank 
reports. Data are available for failed banks in 44 countries.25 We use all banks in Bankscope with 
available financial information for the failed bank analysis. Overall, we have 5,372 banks, of 
which 4.2% failed during the period 2007-2009.  
                                                 
25 These 44 countries include: Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Croatia, 
Czech Rep, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,  
Lithuania, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovak Rep, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States, and Venezuela. For the troubled bank analysis, the number of sample countries is 68 (less Iran and 
Suriname from the full sample of countries listed in Table 2). 
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We next define a composite measure for troubled banks, coded one if it satisfies any of the 
following three criteria in 2007 or 2008 or 2009: (1) incurs a loss (i.e., net income < 0), (2) has a 
low capital ratio (i.e., equity over assets < 10%), and (3) recognizes a large loan loss provisions 
(i.e., loan loss provisions/total loans > 1%). These benchmarks are reasonable because the mean 
(median) values of ROA, equity to total assets ratio, and LLP to loans ratio during the pre-crisis 
period (i.e., 2000-2006) are 2.19% (1.44%), 19.46% (14.14%), 0.11% (0.19%),  respectively.  To 
ensure that these banks were not troubled prior to 2007, we delete banks that satisfy any of the 
above criteria in 2006. Thus, our tests relate to banks that were healthy in 2006 but are troubled in  
2007-2009. For the troubled bank analysis, we have 3,622 banks with 33% classified as troubled. 
The number of banks used is smaller than the failed banks analysis because we deleted banks that 
are financially weak in the pre-crisis period. 
 We use the following logistic model (clustered by country) to test the association between 
national culture and bank financial trouble during the crisis period. This test specification follows 
Lel and Miller (2008) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). 
Bank failure or trouble = γ0 + γ1 CULTURE + γ2 SIZE1 + γ3 GROWTH + γ4 LOANS  
    + γ5 LEV + γ6 ΔCASH + γ7 LLP1 + γ8 RISK + γ9 W  + e      (4) 
We include bank-level controls that may affect the financial health of banks (i.e., size, 
growth, loans, leverage, change in cash flow, and loan loss provisions). We also include the bank 
risk taking measure in the model as well as the full set of country-level institutional variables. We 
use σ(ROA) to proxy bank risk, although our results are robust to using either σ(NIM) or z-score as 
a proxy for risk. 
We present the results in Table 7. The first four models report results for the failed bank 
analysis and the last four models report results for the troubled bank analysis. As expected, the 
cultural variables have strong association with bank failure and trouble. Specifically, we find that 
 29 
 
IND is positively and significantly associated with bank failure and trouble while UA is negatively 
and significantly associated with bank failure and trouble. As for economic significance, a one 
standard deviation increase in IND increases the probability of bank failure and bank trouble by 
2.67% - 4.79% and 2.38% - 3.56%, respectively. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in 
UA decreases the probability of bank failure and bank trouble by 2.10% - 3.67% and 0.78% - 
1.17%, respectively.26  These results show that banks in societies with low individualism and high 
uncertainty avoidance had a lower incidence of bank failure and trouble during the crisis period, 
most likely due to lower risk taking during the pre-crisis period.     
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Direct and Indirect Effects of National Culture on Bank Risk Taking 
 
Our main tests are designed to examine the direct effects of national culture on bank 
accounting conservatism and risk taking. However, accounting conservatism by itself may also 
have an effect on bank risk taking. Thus, the effects of national culture on risk taking could be 
direct and also indirect through conservatism. To test this, we first develop a measure for relative 
bank conservatism which is proxied by mean abnormal LLA estimated over the period 2000-2006 
as the residual from the following regression (clustered by banks): 
LLAt = β0 + β1 SIZEt + β2 HOMPt+ β3 CAPt + β4 LNGROt + β5 NPLt   
                  + COUNTRY + YEAR + εi,k       (5) 
Details of the variable definitions are shown in Table 1. Abnormal LLA is decile-ranked and 
scaled between zero and one, with higher values indicating greater conservatism.  
                                                 
26 To assess the economic significance, we calculate the marginal effect of risk measures on the incidence of bank 
failure. The marginal effect indicates the change in the probability of bank failure per standard deviation change in the 
risk measure (holding other independent variables constant). The marginal effect per standard deviation (SD) change 
for the risk variable is computed as p x (1-p) x b x SD, where p is the base rate and b is the estimated coefficient from 
the logistic regression (Liao 1994).  
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We use path analysis to decompose the correlation between the source variable (national 
culture) and the outcome variable (bank risk taking) into direct and indirect (mediated) paths. This 
decomposition provides evidence on the existence and relative importance of the direct and 
indirect paths between national culture and bank risk taking. Our approach closely follows the 
methodology in Bhattacharya et al. (2012).  
Panels A and B of Table 8 present results when the source variable is Individualism (IND) 
and Uncertainty Avoidance (UA), respectively. We denote correlations with r and path coefficients 
with p. In Panel A, the Pearson correlation between IND and various proxies of risk taking is 
between 0.22 and 0.48.The direct and mediated paths decompose this correlation into the portion 
attributable to the direct link between IND and risk taking and the indirect link, mediated by the 
relative bank conservatism (CONS).27  The correlation between IND and various proxies of risk 
ranges from 94 to 99 percent attributable to a direct path between IND and risk, and between 1 and 
6 percent attributable to the mediated path. We find similar results in Panel B when culture is 
measured by Uncertainty Avoidance (UA). Overall, the results in Table 8 indicate that culture 
plays a more important direct effect on bank risk taking. The indirect effect of culture on risk 
                                                 
27 The ratio of the direct path coefficient, p[IND, Risk], to the total correlation (labeled percentage in the table) is the 
portion of the correlation between IND and risk taking that is attributable to the direct path. Similarly, p[IND,CONS] 
and p[CONS, Risk] are the path coefficients between individualism and conservatism and  between conservatism and 
risk taking, respectively. The mediated path is the product of p[IND, CONS] and p[CONS, Risk]. The ratio of the 
mediated path to the total correlation, labeled percentage, captures the portion of the correlation between 
individualism and risk taking that is attributable to the mediated effect. 
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taking through accounting conservatism is relatively small in magnitude even though the 
correlations are statistically significant in most cases.28  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
 Other Hofstede Dimensions of National Culture  
 
We consider two dimensions of national culture - individualism and uncertainty avoidance 
- in the main tests because prior research documents consistent effects of these cultural dimensions 
on managerial decisions. For completeness, we also examine whether the two other commonly 
discussed cultural dimensions of Hofstede, namely masculinity and power distance, are associated 
with bank conservatism, risk taking, and crisis period performance. High masculinity societies 
emphasize achievements and competitiveness, which may lead to higher risk taking behavior and 
less conservative financial reporting. In high power distance societies, decisions are more 
centralized and managers have greater influence, which may result in higher risk taking and lower 
reporting conservatism. 
Our untabulated results indicate that, in the conservatism tests, lower masculinity and 
power distance societies recognize timelier loan loss provisions and loan loss allowance (but not 
timelier earnings declines and loan charge-offs) than societies with higher masculinity and power 
distance. Hence, we do not observe a consistent relation between the masculinity and power 
distance dimensions of culture on bank conservatism. We also include all four dimensions of 
                                                 
28 The results reported in Table 8 do not control for other factors known to affect risk taking by banks. Following 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012), we also include other variables (SIZE1, REVG, EQTY, and TOOBIG) in equation (2) as 
source variables that are posited to have a direct path to risk taking and, therefore, to act like control variables in a 
regression. The correlation between IND and various proxies of risk ranges from 50 to 81 percent attributable to a 
direct path between IND and risk, and between 2 and 5 percent attributable to the mediated path. The correlation 
between UA and various proxies of risk ranges from 74 to 96 percent attributable to a direct path between UA and risk, 
and between 2 and 3 percent attributable to the mediated path. Overall, the results indicate that culture plays a more 
important direct effect, relative to the indirect effect, on bank risk taking, even after controlling for other factors that 
are associated with risk taking by banks. 
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Hofstede’s culture variables in the same regression model.29 The results indicate that while the 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance dimensions of culture are still associated with bank 
conservatism in the predicted directions, the masculinity and power distance dimensions of culture 
lose their significance in some models. Overall, our results indicate that individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance have a greater impact on bank conservatism than masculinity and power 
distance. 
In the risk taking tests, only power distance is consistently associated with higher risk 
taking for all three proxies of risk. As before, when we include all four cultural dimensions in the 
same regression model, we find that individualism and uncertainty avoidance are associated with 
risk taking in the predicted direction, but the impacts of power distance and masculinity on risk 
taking are weak or insignificant. 
Lastly, in the crisis period analysis, we find that masculinity is significantly associated 
with greater incidence of bank trouble. When all of Hofstede’s culture measures are included in 
the same regression, all four dimensions are associated with greater likelihood of bank trouble in 
the predicted directions. In the failed bank analysis, all the culture variables, except masculinity 
are associated with greater likelihood of bank failure. 
Overall, we observe a consistent and systematic impact of individualism and uncertainty 
avoidance on bank conservatism, risk taking and financial distress, but do not observe such 
consistent relations for masculinity and power distance.  
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Caution is required to interpret the results when all dimensions of culture are included in the regression because 
some culture variables are highly correlated. For example, the correlation between individualism and power distance 
is -0.62. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 The primary research questions addressed in this study are whether and how two important 
dimensions of national culture, individualism and uncertainty avoidance, influence bank 
accounting conservatism and risk taking. We address these questions by analyzing a sample of 
banks from 70 countries over the period 2000-2006, just prior to the financial crisis. In additional 
tests, we explore the relation between culture and bank failure and financial trouble during the 
recent financial crisis spanning the period 2007-2009. 
 Our empirical results indicate that banks in low individualism and high uncertainty 
avoidance societies report earnings more conservatively than banks in high individualism and low 
uncertainty avoidance societies. Additionally, we find that banks in low individualism and high 
uncertainty avoidance cultures exhibit lower levels of risk taking as reflected in volatility of net 
interest margin, volatility of earnings, and z-score.  Lastly, we find that banks in low individualism 
and high uncertainty avoidance cultures are less likely to fail or experience financial trouble 
during the crisis period.   
 Our primary contribution is to document that differences in national culture are related to 
differences in bank financial reporting properties, risk taking, and financial distress. Our study 
adds to prior research on factors affecting bank reporting conservatism. Nichols et al. (2009) 
document that bank ownership structure is an important determinant of reporting conservatism. 
We provide evidence that another important determinant of bank reporting conservatism is culture. 
This finding is especially important for studies that examine cross-country differences in financial 
reporting. Second, our study extends prior research on risk taking by banks by documenting that in 
addition to institutions, regulation, and governance, the individualism and uncertainty avoidance 
dimensions of national culture also affect risk taking of banks. Overall, our findings support the 
growing awareness among researchers studying international financial markets that informal 
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institutions such as culture matter in financial reporting and financial decisions, even when those 
decisions are made by sophisticated professional managers.     
 Our study is subject to the following limitations. First, Hofstede’s cultural variables are 
measured at the country level whereas our tests are primarily based on bank-level analysis. 
Although, we examine the sensitivity of our results by replacing the bank-level data with country-
year level data, we still assume that the Hofstede measures are constant over time, in particular, 
over our sample period of seven years. Second, we note that the reported relations between 
national culture, bank conservatism, and risk taking are observed associations and may not result 
from underlying causal relations. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
 
National Culture variables 
IND = measure of individualism from Hofstede (2001).
UA = measure of uncertainty avoidance from Hofstede (2001). 
   
Variables used in accounting conservatism
ΔNIt = change in net income from year t-1 to year t divided by total assets at the end of year t-1.
ΔNIt-1 = change in net income from year t-2 to year t-1 divided by total assets at the end of year t-
2. 
DΔNIt-1 = 1 if ΔNIt-1 is negative, 0 otherwise.
SIZEt = natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year t.
LLPt = loan loss provisions for year t divided by total loans at the end of year t-1.
ΔNPLt-1 = nonperforming loans divided by total loans at the end of year t-1 minus nonperforming 
loans divided by total loans at the end of year t-2.
ΔNPLt = nonperforming loans divided by total loans at the end of year t minus nonperforming 
loans divided by total loans at the end of year t-1.
ΔNPLt+1 = nonperforming loans divided by total loans at the end of year t+1 minus nonperforming 
loans divided by total loans at the end of year t.
NCOt = net loan charge-offs for year t divided by total loans at the end of year t-1.
NCOt+1 = net loan charge-offs for year t+1 divided by total loans at the end of year t.
LLAt = loan loss allowance at the end of year t divided by total loans at the end of year t-1.
LLAt-1 = loan loss allowance at the end of year t-2 divided by total loans at the end of year t-1.
HOMPt = homogeneous loans (consumer loans) in year t as a percentage of total assets at the end 
of year t. 
HOMPt-1 = homogeneous loans (consumer loans) in year t-1 as a percentage of total assets at the end 
of year t-1. 
CAPt = capital ratio for period t.
LNGROt = total loans at the end of year t divided by total loans at the end of year t-1.
NPLt = nonperforming loans at the end of year t divided by total loans at the end of year t.
LCOt = loan charge-offs for year t divided by total loans at the end of year t-1. 
   
Variables used in risk taking and financial crisis tests
σ(ROA) = volatility of earnings over the period 2000-2006.
σ(NIM) = volatility of net interest margin over the period 2000–2006. 
z-score = log of (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA) where ROA is earnings before taxes and loan loss 
provisions divided by assets, CAR is capital-asset ratio, and σ(ROA) is the standard 
deviation of ROA. The ROA and capital-asset ratio are calculated as the mean over 
2000–2006, and σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA estimated over 2000–2006. 
We multiply the score by -1, so that higher z-score implies more risk taking.
Failed Banks = 1 if the bank fails during the crisis period 2007-2009, 0 otherwise.  
Troubled Banks  
 
= 1 if the bank is in financial trouble during the crisis period 2007-2009, 0 otherwise. A 
troubled bank is defined as a bank that satisfies any of the following criteria in 2007-
2009: (1) incurs a loss (i.e., net income < 0), (2) has a low capital ratio (i.e., equity over 
assets < 10%), and (3) recognizes a large loan loss provision (i.e., loan loss 
provisions/total loans > 1%). To ensure that these banks were not troubled prior to 2007, 
banks that satisfy any of the above criteria in 2006 are deleted from the sample. Thus, 
sample banks used in the tests include only banks that were healthy in 2006 but are 
troubled in 2007-2009.
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Control variables 
SIZE1 =  log of total assets,  averaged over 2000-2006.
REVG = growth in net interest revenue, averaged over 2000-2006. 
LLP1 = loan loss provisions divided by total loans, averaged over 2000-2006.
EQTY = equity divided by total assets, averaged over 2000-2006. 
TOOBIG = an indicator that the bank is too big to fail. It equals one if the bank’s share of the 
country’s total deposits is more than 10% over 2000-2006, zero otherwise.
GROWTH = growth in total assets from the beginning to the end of the year 2006.
LOANS = total loans divided by total assets at the end of the year 2006. 
LEV = total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the year 2006. 
ΔCASH = change in annual cash flows (income before taxes and loan loss provisions) divided by 
total assets at the end of the year 2006.
LLP1 = loan loss provisions for year t divided by total assets at the end of the year 2006.
RISK = volatility of earnings over the period 2000-2006.
 
Country-level control variables 
DI = indicator variable that equals one if the country has deposit insurance, zero otherwise. 
Data  from Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2008). 
COMP = competition index, measured using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, which equals the 
sum of the squares of the market shares (deposits) of each individual bank in each 
individual countries. The index is calculated over the period 2000-2006 and ranges from 
zero to one, with a higher value indicating greater monopoly power.
CR = index aggregating the following creditor rights: absence of automatic stay in 
reorganization, requirement for creditors’ consent or minimum dividend for a debtor to 
file for reorganization, secured creditors are ranked first in reorganization, and removal 
of incumbent management upon filing for reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4. 
Data originally from La Porta et al. (1998) and updated in Djankov et al. (2007). 
IS = information sharing index that equals 1 if either a public registry or a private bureau 
operates in the country, 0 otherwise. Data from Djankov et al. (2007).
ENFORCE = Law enforcement index that ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating greater 
law enforcement. Data from the Economic Freedom of the World: 2010 Annual Report.
COMMON = indicator that equals one if the legal origin is common law, zero otherwise. Data from La 
Porta et al. (1998). 
LGDP = log of GDP per capita, in constant 2000 US dollars. Data from World Development 
Indicators and Global Development Finance database 
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Table 2: Institutional variable measures by country 
Country IND UA DI COMP CR IS ENFORCE COMMON LGDP 
No. of 
Banks 
No. of 
Bank-years 
Argentina 46 86 1 0.05 1 1 5.02 0 8.90 136 624 
Australia 90 51 0 0.08 3 1 6.23 1 9.99 107 356 
Austria 55 70 1 0.06 3 1 6.70 0 10.11 311 1,334 
Bangladesh 20 60 1 0.07 2 1 1.15 1 5.95 42 192 
Belgium 75 94 1 0.09 2 1 5.65 0 10.04 107 460 
Benin 60 70 1 0.32 - - 7.51 - 10.75 130 544 
Brazil 38 76 1 0.07 1 1 4.82 0 8.16 264 1,071 
Bulgaria 30 85 1 0.39 2 1 4.77 0 7.55 38 174 
Canada 80 48 1 0.12 1 1 4.81 1 10.09 85 326 
Chile 23 86 1 0.04 2 1 5.11 0 8.60 50 211 
China 20 30 0 0.08 2 0 6.73 0 7.10 76 246 
Colombia 13 80 1 0.05 0 1 1.80 0 7.69 45 206 
Costa Rica 15 86 0 0.99 1 1 3.52 0 8.43 111 274 
Croatia 33 80 1 0.11 3 0 5.40 0 8.45 47 212 
Czech  58 74 1 0.12 3 0 3.54 0 8.70 43 147 
Denmark 74 23 1 0.08 3 1 6.19 0 10.33 165 752 
Ecuador 8 67 1 0.10 0 1 4.38 0 7.24 75 179 
El Salvador 19 94 1 0.12 3 1 3.83 0 7.68 31 122 
Estonia 60 60 1 0.20 - - 6.11 0 8.52 10 52 
Finland 63 59 1 0.16 1 1 8.06 0 10.11 35 102 
France 71 86 1 0.02 0 1 6.91 0 10.05 691 2,908 
Germany 67 65 1 0.02 3 1 6.62 0 10.07 2,165 10,666 
Greece 35 112 1 0.09 1 1 4.13 0 9.39 50 136 
Guatemala 6 101 1 0.11 1 1 3.39 0 7.50 6 13 
Hong Kong 25 29 0 0.10 4 1 7.69 1 10.20 142 408 
Hungary 80 82 1 0.23 1 1 7.15 0 8.56 37 132 
India 48 40 1 0.07 2 0 2.59 1 6.26 106 428 
Indonesia 14 48 1 0.15 2 1 1.17 0 6.69 77 347 
Iran 41 59 0 0.56 2 1 5.51 0 7.48 15 44 
Ireland 70 35 1 0.07 1 1 4.95 1 10.25 50 157 
Israel 54 81 0 0.09 3 1 3.46 1 9.89 29 140 
Italy 76 75 1 0.03 2 1 3.18 0 9.85 1,060 4,628 
Jamaica 39 13 1 0.13 2 0 3.44 1 8.04 38 96 
Japan 46 92 1 0.02 2 1 6.37 1 10.56 992 4,520 
Korea  18 85 1 0.04 3 1 8.11 1 9.41 56 229 
Latvia 70 63 1 0.08 3 0 7.39 0 8.34 34 158 
Lithuania 60 65 1 0.16 2 1 7.45 0 8.26 18 101 
Malaysia 26 36 1 0.04 3 1 4.27 1 8.39 117 526 
Malta 59 96 1 0.13 - - - - 9.18 13 51 
Mexico 30 82 1 0.06 0 1 5.39 0 8.68 80 322 
Morocco 46 68 0 0.08 1 1 4.30 0 7.09 21 104 
Netherlands 80 53 1 0.12 3 1 5.11 0 10.06 72 230 
New Zealand 79 49 0 0.09 4 1 7.50 1 9.60 20 81 
Norway 69 50 1 0.07 2 1 7.53 0 10.56 124 454 
Pakistan 14 70 0 0.14 1 1 3.55 1 6.28 49 201 
Panama 11 86 0 0.06 4 1 2.26 0 8.35 106 315 
Peru 16 87 1 0.06 0 1 4.77 0 7.68 41 175 
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Philippines 32 44 1 0.23 1 1 3.42 1 6.91 89 246 
Poland 60 93 1 0.05 1 0 4.27 0 8.45 86 274 
Portugal 27 104 1 0.07 1 1 5.25 0 9.24 82 267 
Romania 30 90 1 0.14 2 0 5.21 0 7.58 38 158 
Russia  39 95 1 0.24 2 0 7.53 0 7.66 312 917 
Serbia 25 92 1 0.18 2 0 3.95 0 6.83 47 124 
Singapore 20 8 0 0.26 3 0 8.48 1 10.05 65 174 
Slovakia 52 51 1 0.12 2 1 4.64 0 8.36 26 121 
Slovenia 27 88 1 0.11 3 1 3.87 0 9.25 34 147 
South Africa 65 49 0 0.06 3 1 3.93 1 8.11 76 264 
Spain 51 86 1 0.05 2 1 5.54 0 9.67 321 1,167 
Suriname 47 92 0 0.29 - - - - 7.75 2 14 
Sweden 71 29 1 0.08 1 1 4.73 0 10.25 152 579 
Switzerland 68 58 1 0.10 1 1 6.03 0 10.44 586 2,212 
Taiwan 17 69 1 0.17 2 1 5.55 0 9.59 98 433 
Thailand 20 64 1 0.96 2 0 6.11 1 7.71 62 287 
Trinidad & Tobago 16 55 1 0.11 - - 2.96 - 9.06 19 80 
Turkey 37 85 1 0.05 2 1 6.16 0 8.07 105 325 
United Kingdom 89 35 1 0.03 4 1 6.00 1 10.15 333 1,242 
Uruguay 36 100 1 0.11 3 1 3.88 0 8.69 65 199 
USA 91 46 1 0.01 1 1 7.33 1 10.49 1,648 7,751 
Venezuela 12 76 1 0.06 3 1 3.97 0 8.49 73 283 
Vietnam 20 30 1 0.60 1 1 6.36 0 6.16 30 112 
 
This table reports measures of institutional characteristics by country. The last two columns provide the number of 
banks and bank-years based on the largest sample used in the study. Please see Table 1 for variable definitions.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Bank-level data for conservatism tests 
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
No. of 
countries 
No. of  
obs. 
ΔNIt 0.002 0.000 0.016 -0.063 0.089 70 52,530 
ΔNIt-1 0.002 0.000 0.017 -0.067 0.098 70 52,530 
DΔNI 0.333 0.000 0.471 0.000 1.000 70 52,530 
SIZE 7.183 6.953 2.048 -1.054 14.543 70 52,530 
LLPt 0.010 0.005 0.023 -0.036 0.168 70 51,130 
ΔNPLt-1 -0.001 -0.001 0.043 -0.192 0.220 69 26,937 
ΔNPLt -0.002 -0.001 0.040 -0.182 0.210 69 27,693 
ΔNPLt+1 -0.002 -0.001 0.034 -0.147 0.175 68 25,530 
NCOt 0.010 0.002 0.030 -0.015 0.227 68 20,133 
NCOt+1 0.009 0.002 0.026 -0.021 0.194 68 18,530 
LLAt 0.041 0.019 0.073 0.000 0.526 69 27,203 
LLAt-1 0.045 0.020 0.078 0.000 0.554 68 26,016 
HOMPt 0.577 0.612 0.218 0.000 0.970 70 52,530 
HOMPt-1 0.576 0.610 0.216 0.001 0.967 70 52,530 
CAPt 0.106 0.076 0.108 0.012 0.725 70 52,526 
LNGROt 0.129 0.061 0.336 -0.670 2.060 70 52,013 
NPLt 0.056 0.021 0.087 0.000 0.544 70 23,859 
LCOt 0.012 0.002 0.034 0.000 0.264 67 19,059 
 
Panel B: Bank-level data for risk taking test 
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
No. of 
countries 
No. of obs. 
σ(ROA) 0.006 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.087 70 6,622 
σ(NIM) 0.008 0.003 0.025 0.000 0.826 70 6,622 
z-score -3.486 -3.567 1.080 -8.879 3.124 70 6,622 
SIZE 7.049 6.793 1.913 1.275 14.137 70 6,622 
REVG 0.104 0.065 0.186 -0.989 1.000 70 6,622 
LLP 0.027 0.006 0.355 0.000 10.000 70 6,622 
EQTY 0.105 0.078 0.100 -0.103 0.975 70 6,622 
TOOBIG 0.008 0.000 0.091 0.000 1.000 70 6,622 
  
Panel C: Country-level data 
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
No. of  
Countries 
No. of obs. 
IND 44.03 40.00 23.97 6.00 91.00 70 70 
UA 67.51 70.00 23.64 8.00 112.00 70 70 
DI 0.81 1.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 70 70 
COMP 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.87 70 70 
CR 1.95 2.00 1.05 0.00 4.00 65 65 
IS -0.82 -1.00 0.39 -1.00 0.00 65 65 
ENFORCE 5.16 5.11 1.72 1.15 8.48 68 68 
COMMON 0.29 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 66 66 
LGDP 8.71 8.58 1.27 5.95 10.75 70 70 
 
Panels A and B report descriptive statistics for the bank-level variables used in the accounting conservatism and risk 
taking tests, respectively. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the country-level institutional variables. Please see 
Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4: Correlations 
Panel A: Pearson correlations for bank-level variables used in the conservatism tests
ΔNIt ΔNIt-1 DΔNI SIZE LLPt ΔNPLt-1 ΔNPLt ΔNPLt+1 NCOt NCOt+1 LLAt LLAt-1 HOMPt HOMPt-1 CAPt LNGROt NPLt LCOt
ΔNIt 1.00 
ΔNIt-1 -0.18 1.00 
DΔNI 0.09 -0.41 1.00 
SIZE 0.03 0.04 -0.02 1.00 
LLPt -0.10 0.00 0.06 -0.01 1.00
ΔNPLt-1 0.04 -0.20 0.12 -0.03 0.12 1.00
ΔNPLt -0.18 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.25 0.01 1.00
ΔNPLt+1 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 1.00
NCOt 0.05 0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.49 0.12 -0.03 -0.04 1.00
NCOt+1 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.54 0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.74 1.00
LLAt 0.06 0.04 0.08 -0.07 0.50 0.18 0.16 -0.17 0.48 0.49 1.00 
LLAt-1 0.20 0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.28 0.18 -0.17 -0.17 0.49 0.38 0.81 1.00
HOMPt -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 0.00 0.02 0.08 -0.17 -0.10 -0.19 -0.21 1.00
HOMPt-1 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 0.02 0.07 0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.16 -0.20 0.94 1.00
CAPt 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.20 0.17 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.32 -0.26 -0.24 1.00
LNGROt 0.16 0.10 -0.05 0.12 -0.06 -0.09 -0.20 0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.03 -0.12 0.03 1.00
NPLt
 
0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.14 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 1.00
LCOt 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.51 0.12 -0.03 -0.05 1.00 0.74 0.55 0.56 -0.18 -0.11 0.32 -0.09 0.07 1.00
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations for bank-level variables used in the risk taking tests
σ(ROA) σ(NIM) z-score SIZE REVG LLPAT EQTY TOOBIG
σ(ROA) 1.00
σ(NIM) 0.35 1.00
z-score 0.60 0.17 1.00
SIZE 0.02 0.03 0.21 1.00
REVG 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.15 1.00
LLPAT 0.07 0.03 0.03 -0.05 -0.01 1.00
EQTY 0.53 0.29 0.03 -0.17 0.12 0.09 1.00
TOOBIG 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.00 -0.03 1.00
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Panel C: Pearson correlations between country-level variables
IND UA DI COMP CR IS ENFORCE COMMON LGDP
IND 1.00 
UA -0.23 1.00
DI 0.07 0.19 1.00
COMP -0.26 -0.03 -0.21 1.00
CR 0.12 -0.21 -0.29 -0.05 1.00 
IS 0.10 0.10 -0.02 -0.12 -0.13 1.00
ENFORCE 0.40 -0.17 -0.03 -0.01 0.14 -0.07 1.00
COMMON 0.13 -0.47 -0.31 -0.06 0.26 -0.04 0.03 1.00
LGDP 0.60 -0.09 0.09 -0.24 0.22 0.28 0.51 0.09 1.00
 
Panels A and B report Pearson correlations between the bank-level variables used in the conservatism and risk taking tests, respectively. Panel C reports Pearson 
correlations between the country-level institutional variables. Please see Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 5: Relation between national culture and accounting conservatism 
 
Panel A: Earnings changes 
   CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA
Variable  Predicted sign Model (1)
 
Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Constant α0 ? -0.003
(-1.85)*
0.005
(1.25)
-0.003 
(-1.95)** 
0.005
(1.26)
DΔNIt-1 α1 ? 0.001
(0.13)
0.001
(0.21)
0.001 
(0.26) 
0.001
(0.25)
ΔNIt-1 α2 + 0.254
(2.59)###
0.254
(2.60)###
0.278 
(2.05)## 
0.281
(2.05)##
ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 α3 - -0.965
(-3.16)###
-0.967
(-3.16)###
-1.010 
(-4.01)### 
-1.015
(-4.03)###
CULTURE α4 ? 0.002
(0.93)
0.006
(2.44)**
0.003 
(1.51) 
0.002
(1.31)
CULTURE*DΔNIt-1 α5 ? 0.007
(1.34)
0.006
(1.22)
-0.021 
(-5.16)*** 
-0.021
(-5.04)***
CULTURE*ΔNIt-1 α6 -/+ -0.563
(-1.93)##
-0.560
(-1.91)# 
0.018 
(1.21) 
0.179
(1.21)
CULTURE*ΔNIt-1*DNIt-1 α7 +/- 1.561
(3.26)###
1.556
(3.24)###
-1.299 
 (-3.44)### 
-1.295
 (-3.42)###
SIZE α8 ? 0.001 
(4.55)*** 
0.001 
(4.45)*** 
0.001 
(3.95)*** 
0.001 
(3.70)*** 
SIZE*DΔNIt-1 α9 ? -0.001 
(-0.90) 
-0.001 
(-0.92) 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
SIZE *ΔNIt-1 α10 ? -0.038 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.038 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.035 
(-2.14)** 
-0.036 
(-2.17)** 
SIZE *ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 α11 ? 0.041 
(0.89) 
0.042 
(0.90) 
0.064 
(1.58) 
0.065 
(1.61) 
DI α12 ?  -0.001
(-0.01)
 0.091
(1.09)
COMP α13 ?  0.208
(0.85)
 0.308
(1.30)
CR α14 ?  0.031
(1.76)*
 0.030
(1.78)*
IS α15 ?  -0.259
(-1.92)*
 -0.209
(-1.47)
ENFORCE α16 ?  0.024
(1.69)*
 0.016
(0.99)
COMMON α17 ?  -0.055
(-1.49)
 -0.003
(-0.08)
LGDP α18 ?  -0.075
(-1.98)** 
 -0.081
(-2.02)** 
 
YEAR  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%)   24.60 24.77 24.71 24.92
Observations   52,530 51,789 52,530 51,789
Countries   70 65 70 65
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Loan loss provisions 
   CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA 
Variable  Predicted 
sign 
Model (1) 
 
Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Constant β0 ? 0.018 
(1.81)* 
0.086 
(2.94)*** 
0.008 
(0.80) 
0.084 
(2.75)*** 
ΔNPLt-1 β1 + 0.534 
(2.68)### 
0.538 
(2.69) ### 
0.149 
(2.63)### 
0.150 
(2.65)### 
ΔNPLt β2 + 0.448 
(2.64)### 
0.452 
(2.65)### 
0.316 
(2.14)## 
0.323 
(2.16)## 
ΔNPLt+1 β3 + 
 
0.026 
(0.19) 
0.028 
(0.20) 
0.023 
(0.32) 
0.020 
(0.27) 
NCOt β4 + 0.310 
(1.89)## 
0.310 
(1.89)## 
0.106 
(0.38) 
0.114 
(0.41) 
NCOt+1 β5 + 0.074 
(1.15) 
0.074 
(1.15) 
0.056 
(0.85) 
0.058 
(0.88) 
CULTURE β6 ? -0.041 
(-4.47)*** 
-0.022 
(-3.52)*** 
0.009 
(1.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
CULTURE* ΔNPLt-1 β7 -/+ -1.015 
(-2.50)### 
-1.023 
(-2.51)### 
0.894 
(2.17)## 
0.910 
(2.20)## 
CULTURE* ΔNPLt 
 
β8 -/+ -0.298 
(-3.00)### 
-0.299 
(-3.01)### 
0.292 
(2.63)### 
0.294 
(2.64)### 
CULTURE* ΔNPLt+1 β9 -/+ -0.076 
(-0.28) 
-0.075 
(-0.27) 
-0.087 
(-0.28) 
-0.099 
(-0.32) 
CULTURE* NCOt β10 ? 1.799 
(2.41)** 
1.806 
(2.42)** 
0.213 
(0.29) 
0.258 
(0.34) 
CULTURE* NCOt+1 β11 ? -0.098 
(-1.92)* 
-0.099 
(-1.94)* 
0.013 
(0.12) 
0.006 
(0.06) 
LLAt-1 β12 - -0.094 
(-2.03)## 
-0.096 
(-2.05)## 
-0.080 
(-1.65)## 
-0.082 
(-1.68)## 
HOMPt-1 β13 - 0.007 
(0.93) 
0.013 
(1.68)## 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.009 
(1.21) 
CAPt 
 
β14 + -0.004 
(-0.20) 
-0.004 
(-0.22) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
LNGROt 
 
β15 + 0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.002 
(-0.37) 
-0.003 
(-0.40) 
-0.006 
(-0.79) 
SIZEt 
 
β16 ? -0.001 
(-1.20) 
-0.001 
(-1.78)* 
0.001 
(1.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
SIZE*ΔNPLt-1 
 
β17 ? 0.075 
(2.73)*** 
0.075 
(2.74)*** 
0.065 
(2.40)** 
0.066 
(2.42)** 
SIZE*ΔNPLt 
 
β18 ? 0.075 
(2.60)*** 
0.075 
(2.61)*** 
0.070 
(2.24)** 
0.071 
(2.25)** 
SIZE*ΔNPLt+1 
 
β19 ? -0.003 
(-0.17) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.008 
(-0.45) 
-0.007 
(-0.41) 
SIZE*NCOt 
 
β20 ? 0.073 
(2.47)** 
0.072 
(2.47)** 
0.025 
(0.83) 
0.025 
(0.83) 
SIZE*NCOt+1 
 
β21 ? -0.006 
(-0.65) 
-0.006 
(-0.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.002 
(-0.21) 
DI β22 ?  0.166 
(0.48) 
 0.397 
(1.02) 
COMP β23 ?  0.039 
(0.03) 
 -0.085 
(-0.07) 
CR β24 ?  0.029 
(0.21) 
 0.279 
(2.05)** 
IS β25 ?  0.748 
(1.43) 
 0.017 
(0.03) 
ENFORCE β26 ?  0.024 
(0.21) 
 0.091 
(0.76) 
COMMON β27 ?  -0.631 
(-2.05)** 
 -0.518 
(-1.87)* 
LGDP β28 ?  -0.776 
(-2.81)*** 
 -0.876 
(-2.89)*** 
YEAR   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj R2 (%)   63.94 64.16 58.91 59.34 
Observations   13,065 12,993 13,065 12,993 
Countries   61 57 61 57 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel C: Loan loss allowance 
    CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA
Variable  Predicted 
sign 
Model (1)
 
Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Constant β0 ? 0.072
(12.52)***
0.146
(11.42)***
0.013 
(1.63)* 
0.152
(11.92)***
CULTURE β1 -/+ -0.058
(-22.33)###
-0.040
(-8.65)###
0.038 
(9.87)### 
0.028
(6.64)###
SIZEt 
 
β2 ? 0.001
(0.31) 
-0.001
(-2.43)** 
0.001 
(2.35)** 
-0.001
(-2.48)** 
HOMPt β3 ? -0.039
(-5.84)***
-0.031
(-4.84)***
-0.051 
(-7.33)*** 
-0.051
(-5.06)***
CAPt 
 
β4 + 0.165
(8.90)### 
0.157
(8.17)### 
0.188 
(9.79)### 
0.157
(8.18)### 
LNGROt 
 
β5 ? -0.014
(-7.86)*** 
-0.017
(-8.87)*** 
-0.012 
(-6.78)*** 
-0.018
(-9.11)*** 
NPLt 
 
β6 + 0.002
(1.22) 
0.002
(1.16) 
0.002 
(1.25) 
0.002
(1.16) 
DI β7 ?  2.159
(6.08)***
 1.740
(4.71)***
COMP β8 ?  -2.280
(-3.10)***
 -1.248
(-1.74)*
CR β9 ?  0.200
(1.52)
 0.520
(4.43)***
IS β10 ?  -0.570
(-1.14)
 0.110
(0.22)
ENFORCE β11 ?  -0.068
(-0.87)
 0.009
(0.11)
COMMON β12 ?  0.137
(0.68)
 0.208
(1.09)
LGDP β13 ?  -0.969
(-6.01)***
 -1.583
(-11.01)***
YEAR   Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%)   17.40 19.96 13.54 19.49
Observations   23,859 23,704 23,859 23,704
Countries   70 65 70 65
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel D: Loan charge-offs 
   CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA
Variable  Predicted 
sign 
Model (1)
 
Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Constant β0 ? 0.124
(1.97)**
0.260
(2.02)**
0.115 
(1.99)** 
0.266
(2.05)**
CULTURE β1 -/+ -0.046
(-1.83) ##
-0.014
(-0.89)
0.011 
(0.27) 
0.004
(0.14)
SIZEt 
 
β2 ? -0.004
(-1.05) 
-0.005
(-1.32) 
-0.004 
(-1.11) 
-0.005
(-1.40) 
HOMPt β3 ? -0.095
(-2.40)**
-0.091
(-2.50)***
-0.103 
(-2.42)** 
-0.093
(-2.50)***
CAPt 
 
β4 ? -0.004
(-1.88)* 
-0.004
(-1.91)* 
-0.004 
(-1.98)** 
-0.004
(-1.96)** 
LNGROt 
 
β5 ? -0.049
(-1.89)* 
-0.058
(-1.87)* 
-0.047 
(-1.86)* 
-0.056
(-1.88)* 
ΔNPLt-1 β6 +
 
0.007
(2.73)### 
0.007
(2.53)### 
0.022 
(14.56)### 
0.021
(15.32)### 
CULTURE* ΔNPLt-1 β7 -/+ -0.077
(-8.84)###
-0.074
(-7.67)###
0.094 
(11.46)### 
0.090
(12.67) ###
ΔNPLt β8 ? 0.019
(4.62)***
0.020
(4.55)***
0.049 
(23.88)*** 
0.049
(24.83)***
CULTURE* ΔNPLt β9 ? -0.184
(-14.44)***
-0.183
(-13.98)***
0.213 
(17.37)*** 
0.002
(18.49)***
DI β10 ?  -1.346
(-0.73)
 -1.397
(-0.66)
COMP β11 ?  -0.750
(-0.24)
 -0.089
(-0.03)
CR β12 ?  -0.098
(-0.13)
 0.087
(0.10)
IS β13 ?  5.050
(1.88)*
 5.092
(1.92)*
ENFORCE β14 ?  1.285
(2.03)**
 1.318
(1.89)*
COMMON β15 ?  -4.316
(-1.53)
 -4.377
(-1.67)*
LGDP β16 ?  -2.165
(-2.14)** 
 -2.289
(-2.20)** 
 
YEAR   Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 (%)   8.95 9.31 9.33 9.79
Observations   16,322 16,234 16,322 16,234
Countries   67 63 67 63
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Panel A reports the results of the following regression, clustered by country and bank: 
ΔNIt = α0 + α1DΔNIt-1 + α2ΔNIt-1 + α 3ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 + α4CULTURE+ α5CULTURE*DΔNIt-1  
+ α6CULTURE*ΔNIt-1 + α7CULTURE*ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 + α8SIZE + α9SIZE*DΔNIt-1 + α10SIZE*ΔNIt-1  
+ α11SIZE*ΔNIt-1*DΔNIt-1 + γWk + YEAR + εi,k   
 
Panel B reports the results of the following regression, clustered by country and bank: 
LLPt  = β0 + β1 ΔNPLt-1 + β2 ΔNPLt + β3 ΔNPLt+1 + β4 NCOt + β5 NCOt+1 + β6 CULTURE + β7 CULTURE*ΔNPLt-1  
                   + β8 CULTURE*ΔNPLt+ β9 CULTURE*ΔNPLt+1 + β10 CULTURE*NCOt+ β11 CULTURE*NCOt+1 
                   + β12 LLAt-1 + β13 HOMPt-1 + β14 CAPt + β15 LNGROt + β16 SIZEt + β17 SIZEt*ΔNPLt-1 + β18 SIZEt*ΔNPLt  
+ β19 SIZEt*ΔNPLt+1+ β20 SIZEt*NCOt + β21 SIZEt* NCOt+1 + γ Wk + YEAR + εi,k     
 
Panel C reports the results of the following regression, clustered by country and bank: 
LLAt  = β0 + β1 CULTURE + β2 SIZEt + β3 HOMPt+ β4 CAPt + β5 LNGROt + β6 NPLt  + γ Wk + YEAR + εi,k  
  
Panel D reports the results of the following regression, clustered by country and bank: 
LCOt  = β0 + β1 CULTURE + β2 SIZEt + β3 HOMPt+ β4 CAPt + β5 LNGROt + β6 ΔNPLt-1  + β7 CULTURE*ΔNPLt-1  
                 + β8 ΔNPLt + β8 CULTURE*ΔNPLt + γ Wk + YEAR + εi,k    
 
Wk refers to the country-level variables which include DI, COMP, CR, IS, ENFORCE, COMMON, and LGDP. 
Please see Table 1 for variable definitions.   Coefficients on year indicators are not tabulated for brevity. ‘*’, ‘**’, 
and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. ‘#’, ‘##’, and ‘###’ denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (one tailed), respectively. In all panels, the coefficients for all country-level 
variables and the interaction terms for the culture variables are multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation. 
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Table 6: Relation between national culture and risk taking 
  Pred. 
Sign 
Model  
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Model  
(3) 
Model  
(4) 
Model  
(5) 
Model 
 (6) 
Model 
 (7) 
Model 
 (8) 
Model  
(9) 
Model  
(10) 
Model  
(11) 
Model  
(12) 
   Dependent variable:  σ(ROA) Dependent variable:  σ(NIM) Dependent variable:  z-score 
   CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA 
Constant γ0 ? 0.004 
(3.59)*** 
0.546 
(3.05)*** 
-0.007 
(-5.28)*** 
0.016 
(0.59) 
0.005 
(1.33) 
1.201 
(1.79)* 
-0.015 
(-2.66)*** 
0.397 
(0.72) 
-3.139 
(-12.70)*** 
-2.888 
(-10.42)*** 
-5.315 
(-20.83)*** 
-3.856 
(-11.54)*** 
CULTURE γ1 +/- 0.009 
(7.01)### 
0.009 
(5.14) ### 
-0.007 
(-3.55)### 
-0.006 
(-5.02) ### 
0.015 
(3.39)### 
0.017 
(2.74) ### 
-0.013 
(-2.38)### 
-0.012 
(-3.45) ### 
0.015 
(8.27)### 
0.017 
(2.95) ### 
-0.014 
(-4.96)### 
-0.014 
(-2.88) ### 
SIZE1 γ2 ? 0.024 
(2.46)** 
0.019 
(2.81)*** 
0.041 
(3.31)*** 
0.033 
(4.67)*** 
0.041 
(0.93) 
0.036 
(1.96)** 
0.072 
(1.44) 
0.061 
(2.34)** 
0.072 
(4.40)*** 
0.058 
(2.95)*** 
0.105 
(5.57)*** 
0.084 
(3.54)*** 
REVG γ3 + 0.003 
(2.86)### 
0.002 
(2.04) ### 
0.004 
(3.72)### 
0.002 
(2.00) ## 
0.015 
(2.63)### 
0.016 
(2.86) ### 
0.017 
(2.95)### 
0.015 
(2.79) ### 
0.331 
(2.31)### 
0.305 
(2.36) ### 
0.526 
(4.19)### 
0.277 
(2.32) ### 
LLP1 γ4 + 0.048 
(1.08) 
0.048 
(1.82)## 
0.054 
(1.10) 
0.047 
(1.66)## 
0.103 
(1.14) 
0.097 
(1.26)# 
0.113 
(1.14) 
0.099 
(1.28)# 
0.095 
(2.40)### 
0.087 
(2.31) ### 
0.106 
(2.20)### 
0.084 
(2.24) ### 
EQTY 
 
γ5 ? 0.044 
(16.31)*** 
0.043 
(15.38)*** 
0.047 
(16.09)*** 
0.044 
(11.94)*** 
0.066 
(5.34)*** 
0.063 
(4.76)*** 
0.070 
(5.32)*** 
0.064 
(4.97)*** 
0.180 
(0.31) 
-0.040 
(-0.30) 
0.625 
(1.20) 
0.161 
(1.08) 
TOOBIG γ6 ? -0.000 
(-0.43) 
0.073 
(0.62) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.007 
(0.06) 
-0.004 
(-1.57) 
-0.200 
(-1.16) 
-0.003 
(-1.25) 
-0.314 
(-2.04)** 
-0.049 
(-0.29) 
0.094 
(0.45) 
0.009 
(0.05) 
-0.013 
(-0.09) 
DI γ7 +  0.425 
(6.35) ### 
 0.341 
(3.53) ### 
 0.613 
(3.47) ### 
 0.460 
(2.84) ### 
 0.451 
(5.65) ### 
 0.296 
(3.94) ### 
COMP γ8 ?  0.092 
(0.15) 
 0.369 
(2.30)** 
 1.467 
(2.57)*** 
 0.634 
(2.00)** 
 0.204 
(1.60) 
 0.638 
(3.12)*** 
CR γ9 +  0.049 
(3.55) ### 
 0.010 
(1.38) # 
 0.114 
(2.56) ### 
 0.043 
(1.40) # 
 0.060 
(3.88) ### 
 0.013 
(1.02) 
IS γ10 -  0.067 
(0.15) 
 -0.023 
(-0.41) 
 0.021 
(0.12) 
 -0.153 
(-0.86) 
 -0.137 
(-2.29) ### 
 -0.052 
(-1.35)# 
ENFORCE γ11 ?  0.010 
(1.08) 
 0.003 
(0.34) 
 0.015 
(0.66) 
 0.006 
(0.25) 
 -0.014 
(-1.34) 
 -0.021 
(-2.16)** 
COMMON γ12 ?  0.001 
(0.05) 
 0.044 
(2.04)** 
 0.310 
(5.14)*** 
 0.227 
(4.15)*** 
 0.196 
(4.67)*** 
 0.289 
(6.91)*** 
LGDP γ13 ?  -0.032 
(-2.07)** 
 -0.115 
(-4.87)*** 
 -0.072 
(-2.00)** 
 -0.220 
(-4.60)*** 
 -0.018 
(-1.10) 
 -0.165 
(-8.09)*** 
Adj R2 (%)   34.28 35.65 32.14 34.86 11.82 12.99 11.30 12.80 13.68 15.33 11.26 15.62 
Observations   6,622 6,515 6,622 6,515 6,622 6,515 6,622 6,515 6,622 6,515 6,622 6,515 
Countries   70 65 70 65 70 65 70 65 70 65 70 65 
 
The table reports the results of the following regression, clustered by country: 
R = γ0 + γ1 CULTURE + γ2 SIZE1 + γ3 REVG + γ4 LLP1 + γ5 EQTY + γ6 TOOBIG + γ7 W + ε  
Wk refers to the country-level variables which include DI, COMP, CR, IS, ENFORCE, COMMON, and LGDP. Please see Table 1 for variable definitions. ‘*’, 
‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. ‘#’, ‘##’, and ‘###’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (one 
tailed), respectively. In panels A and B, the coefficients for SIZE1, LLP1 and all country-level variables are multiplied by 100 for ease of presentation. 
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Table 7: Relation between national culture and bank failure and trouble 
   Failed Banks Troubled Banks 
   CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA CULTURE=IND CULTURE=UA 
  Predicted sign Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
Constant γ0 ? -0.372 
(38.70)*** 
11.69 
(0.83) 
-3.473 
(40.90)*** 
1.604 
(0.01) 
-0.387 
(1.54) 
2.796 
(0.55) 
0.331 
(1.02) 
-1.237 
(0.11) 
CULTURE γ1 +/- 0.024 
(34.71)### 
0.036 
(17.43)### 
-0.008 
(4.04)## 
-0.012 
(6.09)### 
0.005 
(8.79)### 
0.009 
(8.52) ### 
-0.007 
(15.62)### 
-0.004 
(3.38)## 
SIZE1 γ3 ? 0.163 
(34.01)*** 
0.161 
(20.72)*** 
0.135 
(26.50)*** 
0.130 
(15.23)*** 
0.139 
(69.96)*** 
0.118 
(37.40)*** 
0.123 
(58.45)*** 
0.107 
(31.89)*** 
GROWTH γ4 ? 0.006 
(0.00) 
0.042 
(0.10) 
0.209 
(0.60) 
0.032 
(0.06) 
0.045 
(0.22) 
0.060 
(0.32) 
0.055 
(0.32) 
0.087 
(0.65) 
LOANS γ5 ? 0.681 
(7.02)*** 
0.573 
(7.16)*** 
0.979 
(10.74)*** 
0.728 
(11.43)*** 
0.194 
(2.03) 
0.087 
(0.33) 
0.218 
(2.58) 
0.137 
(0.83) 
LEV γ6 ? 0.070 
(0.01) 
1.000 
(1.23) 
0.572 
(0.87) 
0.914 
(1.14) 
0.234 
(0.38) 
0.158 
(0.14) 
0.082 
(0.05) 
0.055 
(0.02) 
ΔCASH γ7 - -2.537 
(1.34) 
-0.553 
(0.06) 
-1.784 
(0.60) 
-0.109 
(0.01) 
-0.655 
(0.39) 
-1.059 
(0.90) 
-0.715 
(0.49) 
-1.059 
(0.94) 
LLP γ8 + 23.146 
(5.22)## 
6.955 
(0.59) 
39.065 
(13.54)### 
21.670 
(4.14)### 
21.689 
(4.12)## 
48.665 
(14.29) ### 
21.808 
(4.11)### 
46.069 
(13.59) ### 
RISK γ9 + 0.239 
(17.11) ### 
0.177 
(7.50) ### 
0.116 
(4.18)### 
0.138 
(4.70)## 
0.307 
(57.65) ### 
0.299 
(45.56) ### 
0.298 
(56.38) ### 
0.293 
(44.27) ### 
DI γ10 +  2.279 
(7.51)### 
 2.299 
(9.87)### 
 0.006 
(0.00) 
 0.043 
(0.02) 
COMP γ11 ?  -0.191 
(0.00) 
 -2.509 
(0.26) 
 1.179 
(3.36)* 
 0.500 
(0.72) 
CR γ12 +  0.759 
(68.99)### 
 0.882 
(12.61)### 
 0.148 
(6.81)### 
 0.113 
(4.34)## 
IS γ13 -  -0.900 
(2.57)# 
 -0.674 
(1.30) 
 -0.227 
(2.40)# 
 -0.269 
(2.94)## 
ENFORCE γ14 ?  0.081 
(0.68) 
 0.079 
(0.53) 
 0.274 
(67.67)*** 
 0.272 
(65.66)*** 
COMMON γ15 ?  1.705 
(9.78)*** 
 1.552 
(14.16)*** 
 0.003 
(0.00) 
 -0.032 
(0.04) 
LGDP γ16 ?  -5.143 
(1.83) 
 -0.871 
(0.05) 
 -2.010 
(2.87)* 
 -0.469 
(0.16) 
           
Pseudo R2 (%)   6.12 16.91 3.78 15.49 5.96 14.58 6.19 14.35 
Observations   5,372 5,252 5,372 5,252 3,622 3,394 3,622 3,394 
Countries   44 44 44 44 68 64 68 64 
% of troubled banks   4.32 4.32 4.32 4.32 33.46 33.29 33.46 33.29 
The table reports the results of the following regression, clustered by country:  
Bank failure or trouble = γ0 + γ1 CULTURE + γ2 SIZE1 + γ3 GROWTH + γ4 LOANS + γ5 LEV + γ6 ΔCASH + γ7 LLP1 + γ8 RISK + γ9 W + e    
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W refers to the country-level variables which include DI, COMP, CR, IS, ENFORCE, COMMON, and LGDP. Please see Table 1 for variable definitions. ‘*’, 
‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. ‘#’, ‘##’, and ‘###’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (one 
tailed), respectively. 
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Table 8: Direct and indirect effects of national culture on bank risk taking 
 
Panel A: Individualism, conservatism and risk taking 
 Risk=σ(ROA) Risk = σ(NIM) Risk = zscore 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
r[IND, Risk] 0.343  0.217  0.475  
       
Direct path 
   p[IND, Risk] 
0.332 22.55*** 0.215 13.67*** 0.446 33.40*** 
percentage 97%  99%  94%  
       
Mediated path       
   p[IND, CONS] -0.208 -13.52*** -0.208 -13.52*** -0.208 -13.52*** 
   p[CONS, Risk)] -0.053 -3.39*** -0.012 -0.73 -0.140 -9.54*** 
Total mediated path 0.011  0.002  0.029  
percentage 3%  1%  6%  
 
Panel B: Uncertainty avoidance, conservatism and risk taking 
 Risk=σ(ROA) Risk = σ(NIM) Risk = zscore 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
r[UA, Risk] -0.174  -0.133  -0.314  
       
Direct path 
   p[UA, Risk] 
-0.173 -10.97*** -0.128 -8.04*** -0.304 -20.62*** 
percentage 99%  96%  97%  
       
Mediated path       
   p[UA, CONS] 0.116 7.31*** 0.116 7.31*** 0.116 7.31*** 
   p[CONS, Risk)] -0.004 -0.22 -0.042 -2.59*** -0.083 -5.36*** 
Total mediated path -0.001  -0.005  -0.010  
percentage 1%  4%  3%  
 
The table reports path analyses of the links between culture and risk, a direct link, and a link mediated by 
relative conservatism, CONS, which is estimated from the following regression, clustered by banks: 
LLAt  = β0 + β1 SIZEt + β2 HOMPt+ β3 CAPt + β4 LNGROt + β5 NPLt  + COUNTRY + YEAR + εi,k 
     
p indicates path coefficients and r indicates (Pearson) correlation coefficients. Please see Table 1 for 
variable definitions. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. ‘#’, ‘##’, and ‘###’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (one tailed), respectively. 
  
